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AFTER UNITED STATES V. JONES,
AFTER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT THIRD PARTY DOCTRINE
Stephen E. Henderson*
In United States v. Jones, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected
the proposition that the Government can surreptitiously
electronically track vehicle location for an entire month without
Fourth Amendment restraint. While the Court's three opinions
leave much uncertain, in one perspective they fit nicely within a
long string of cases in which the Court is cautiously developing
new standards of Fourth Amendment protection, including a
rejection of a strong third party doctrine. This Article develops
that perspective and provides a cautiously optimistic view of where
search and seizure protections may be headed.
I. INTRODUCTION
United States v. Jones,' in which the Court unanimously held
that month-long Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking of a
vehicle constitutes a Fourth Amendment search, did not in itself
tell us much. The Government took an egregious position, and
therefore lost nine to zero.2 The Court now applies a resurrected
trespass-based conception of search, but we know extremely little
about its application and what results it will alter. Five Justices
. Professor of Law, The University of Oklahoma College of Law. Yale Law
School (J.D., 1999); University of California at Davis (B.S., 1995). The author
is grateful to the North Carolina Journal ofLaw & Technology, and in particular
to Symposium Editor Brandy Barrett, for the invitation to participate in its
Symposium on U.S. v. Jones: Defining a Search in the 21st Century (Jan. 25,
2013), and for the exceptional hospitality during that event. The author is also
grateful to Christopher Slobogin and Leonard Sosnov for comments on an
earlier version of this Article.
'132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
2 See discussion of the Government's argument and the opinions of the
Justices, infra Part Ill.
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believe long-term location tracking is typically a search because it
invades a reasonable, seemingly empirical, expectation of privacy.
And one Justice, Justice Sotomayor, is willing to reconsider the
entire third party doctrine, which holds that one typically retains no
Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy in information
conveyed to another.
But in the broader view, it is not merely one Justice who will
not apply the third party doctrine in a strong form, and thus the
author has previously written the doctrine's obituary.' Jones fits
nicely within a string of cases in which the Court is cautiously
developing new standards of Fourth Amendment protections,
rather than declaring generally applicable categorical rules.' Given
that it was a grand pronouncement of an allegedly categorical rule
in United States v. Miller' that has caused much of the trouble, this
strikes the author' as a sensible way to proceed. One can expect
the road will not be smooth, but we are used to zigs and zags in
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. It is hard to imagine anything
less when the High Court is attempting to ferret out what is
reasonable,' which requires balancing private and law enforcement
3 See Stephen E. Henderson, The Timely Demise of the Fourth Amendment
Third Party Doctrine, 96 IOWA L. REv. 39 (2011).
4 See infra Part II.
' 425 U.S. 435 (1976). "[We] ha[ve] held repeatedly that the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third
party and conveyed by [the third party] to Government authorities, even if the
information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited
purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed." Id. at
443.
6 The author recognizes that avoiding the first person can be stultifying, and to
some is arrogant, but the convention is required by the Journal. See Stephan
Pastis, Sgt. Piggy's Lonely Hearts Club Comic 28 (2004).
7 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856
(2011). The Fourth Amendment provides as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
432 [VOL. 14: 431
After United States v. Jones
interests,' and when technology, policing, crime, and social norms
are constantly in flux.
Much of the ground has been plowed before, including in
articles dating back many years,' which calls for brevity here.
Indeed, Jones will surely spark a new crop of Fourth Amendment
papers, the authors of some of which will read what has gone
before and some of whom will not. But Jones provides a nice
hinge around which to discuss where the Fourth Amendment has
been and where it might be going-and more generally where
citizens' protections against unreasonable searches and seizures,
which do not depend solely upon the Fourth Amendment, might be
going. This Article will analyze that relatively high level, and, like
many others, the author will begin in other fora to drill down into
specifics of how the Fourth Amendment should apply to the
particular techniques of location tracking.'o Part II describes the
relevance of modem technologies and social norms, and how the
third party doctrine has fared in the courts in the last quarter
century. It reveals a doctrine that is more limited and nuanced than
some might think, or at least one that can be so read. Part III
describes the opinions in Jones and analyzes how they fit within
8See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2007).
9 See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment,
58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 390-95 (1974) (discussing a sliding scale proportionality
principle, but worrying "it converts the fourth amendment into one immense
Rorschach blot"); Lewis R. Katz, In Search of a Fourth Amendment for the
Twenty-First Century, 65 IND. L.J. 549, 555, 581 (1990) (proposing a
proportionality framework under which lesser "intrusions" are permissible upon
reasonable suspicion, and thus are less restricted than "full" searches);
Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 1, 4, 75 (1991) (explicitly terming a proportionality test a "proportionality
principle," and advocating it along with an "exigency principle" typically
requiring third party-meaning not merely police officer-review).
10 E.g., Stephen E. Henderson, Real-time and Historic Location Tracking after
United States v. Jones: An Administrable, Mildly Mosaic Approach, 103 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming June 2013); Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic
Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 110 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming);
Christopher Slobogin, Making the Most of Jones v. United States in a
Surveillance Society: A Statutory Implementation of Mosaic Theory, DUKE J.
CONST. L. & PUBLIC P. (forthcoming).
SPRING 2013] 433
N.C. J.L. & TECH.
this greater context. Part IV presents a cautiously optimistic view
of where the law, meaning not only the Fourth Amendment law but
also the statutory law, might be headed.
II. THE THIRD PARTY DOCTRINE BEFORE JONES
A. Origin and Uncertainties
One can debate precisely which cases fall within the third party
doctrine. Indeed, because the doctrine has always been under-
theorized by the Court, it is difficult to know what to make of
information that is provided to a particular party only in the role of
conduit or bailee, and what to make of information that is not
actually provided to any one party, but rather that is potentially
available to all comers. But the following certainly make the
potential list: the "false-friend" cases of Hoffa v. United States"
and United States v. White,12 the bank records case of United State
v. Miller," the phone records case of Smith v. Maryland,14 the
beeper cases of United States v. Knotts" and United States v.
Karo,6 the flyover cases of California v. Ciraolo" and Florida v.
Riley," the open fields cases of Oliver v. United States" and
United States v. Dunn,20 and the garbage case of California v.
Greenwood.2'
The first thing to notice is that the most recent of these cases is
approaching a quarter-century old. Of course, if a doctrine is well
settled and well understood, there is no need to relitigate,
especially at the Supreme Court. But based on the discussion that
follows, this is at least not accurate on the margins, and changed
" 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
12 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
425 U.S. 435 (1976).
14 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
460 U.S. 276 (1983).
16 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
7 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
8 488 U.S. 455 (1989).
' 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
20480 U.S. 294 (1987).
2 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
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social norms and technologies might require even an original
supporter to reconsider the core.
We now live in a world of ubiquitous third party information.
Cash is anonymous, at least if not accompanied by closed-circuit
television recordings and other records, but many rarely use it.22
More and more people, and in more and more places, pay in an
identified and recorded manner.23 Offline library and bookstore
browsing are practically anonymous, but many have replaced them
with online recorded alternatives.2 4 The same goes for dictionary
and encyclopedia browsing.25 Over-the-air broadcast television is
anonymous, but few use it.26 Even many assumedly ephemeral
22 See Credit, Debit, Smart, Electronic Bill Pay - It's All in the Cards: More
Consumers Going Cashless Citing Convenience, Budgeting, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), Sept. 25, 2000, available at 2000 WLNR 9020258
23 See Graham Hiscott, Dawn of the Debit: Cards Now Used More Than
Cash, THE MIRROR, Dec. 3, 2010, available at http://www.thefreelibrary.com/
DAWN+OF+THE+DEBIT%3B+Cards+now+used+more+than+case.-a0243404
780; Aaron Smith et al., The Future of Money in a Mobile Age, PEW INTERNET
& Am. LIFE PROJECT (Apr. 17, 2012), http://www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2012/
Future-of-Money.aspx. Some businesses no longer accept cash. See Richard
Newman, Judge Dismisses Challenge to Airline's No-Cash Policy, THE RECORD
(Aug. 20, 2011), http://www.northjersey.com/news/128114693 Airline s cash
lesscabin passes muster.html.
24 See Bookstores in Decline: Internet Having the Last Word as Readers
Embrace E-Books, SUN SENTINEL, May 13, 2011, available at 2011 WLNR
9561644; Lee Rainie & Maeve Duggan, E-book Reading Jumps; Print Book
Reading Declines, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT (Dec. 27, 2012),
http://libraries.pewintemet.org/2012/12/27/e-book-reading-jumps-print-book-rea
ding-declines/. Not all the news is negative for offline libraries, but much of
what they offer will be online services. See Kathryn Zickuhr et al., Library
Services in the Digital Age, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT (Jan. 22, 2013),
http://libraries.pewinternet.org/2013/01/22/library-services/.
25 See Sue Gardner, The People's Encyclopedia, TULSA WORLD (Jan. 20,
2013), http://www.tulsaworld.com/site/printerfriendlystory.aspx?articleid=
20130120 222 G3 ULNSnel75793&PrintComments=1.; About Wikipedia,
WIKIPEDIA http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:About (last visited Mar. 29,
2013).
26 See According to CEA, Over-the-Air TV Households Slip to 8 Percent of
Total, BROADCAST ENGINEERING (June 7, 2011),
http://broadcastengineering.com/hdtv/cea-over-the-air-tv-households-slip-to-8-
percent. But see Phil Kurz, 46 Million Americans Still Watch TV Exclusively
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conversations, or at least what would have once been ephemeral
conversations, are now held by third parties, because they are
typed rather than spoken, or because a phone or other device
records them.27 What would have been on the hard drive in the
home is now stored in the cloud.2 8 One could go on and on listing
the vast records that are now generated and stored about each of
us, and the effects of digital storage and retrieval, but the point is
amply made: The increase in third party records is not some minor
movement, but rather a tectonic shift. According to Eric Schmidt,
CEO of Google, humanity now generates as much information
every two days as it did from the dawn of civilization up to the
year 2003,29 and much of that information resides with third
parties. Thus, as Paul Ohm has noted, police will do less and less
traditional investigation, and more and more requesting of
information.30 Either the Fourth Amendment outside the home
becomes a relic dependent upon secrecy, or it adapts to this
changed landscape of what affects our security and privacy.
The core of the third party doctrine would seem to be these
words of the Miller Court in refusing Fourth Amendment
protection for bank records:
Over the Air, Says Report, BROADCAST ENGINGEERING (June 8, 2011),
http://broadcastengineering.com/ott/46-million-americans-still-watch-tv-exclusi
vely-over-air-says-report. For a discussion of online providers tracking viewing
habits see David Carr, Giving Viewers What They Want, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25,
2013, at Bl.
27 See Martha Irvine, Is Texting Ruining the Art of Conversation?, TULSA
WORLD (June 10, 2012), http://www.tulsaworld.com/article.aspx/ls texting
ruiningthe_art of conversation/20120610 46 e4_cutlin758609.
28 See Janna Anderson & Lee Rainie, The Future of Cloud Computing, PEW
INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT (June 11, 2010), http://www.pewinternet.org/
Reports/2010/The-future-of-cloud-computing.aspx.
29 See MG Siegler, Eric Schmidt: Every 2 Days We Create As Much
Information As We Did Up To 2003, TECHCRUNCH.COM (Aug. 4, 2010),
http://techcrunch.com/2010/08/04/schmidt-data/. No doubt much of this
generated data is practically meaningless, but even a small fraction of the whole
leaves an enormous amount that people consider private.
30 See Paul Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81
Miss. L. J. 1309, 1321-25 (2012).
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[We] ha[ve] held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not
prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party and
conveyed by [the third party] to Government authorities, even if the
information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a
limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be
betrayed.3
But even this statement of the core might be too expansive. Before
the doctrine made it off the ground, in a series of decisions the
Court granted Fourth Amendment protection to the content of
conversations, including telephone conversations.32 In none of
those cases did the Government obtain those conversations from a
third party provider, and in the most directly relevant case the
Court reached out to decide the issue by deciding a facial challenge
to a state law. Thus, as Orin Kerr has developed, it is fair to say
that the Fourth Amendment protection of telephone conversations
is actually less certain than perhaps we assume it to be.34 But if it
is right to assert Fourth Amendment protection for the contents of
telephone conversations even if obtained via the provider-which
the Court's pen register case seems to assume"-then we have a
"limited" third party doctrine that only removes constitutional
protection from information provided for a third party's use. In
31 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
32 See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969); Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41 (1967); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
3 See Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies:
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REv. 801, 847-50
(2004).
34 See id
3 See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741-42 (1979) (contrasting a pen
register from acquisition of conversation contents).
36 See Stephen E. Henderson, Nothing New Under the Sun? A
Technologically Rational Doctrine ofFourth Amendment Search, 56 MERCER L.
REV. 507, 526-28 (2005). Courts in other contexts have recognized a reasonable
expectation of privacy in something left with a bailee. See United States v.
Most, 876 F.2d 191, 198 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (bag left with store clerk); United
States v. Barry, 853 F.2d 1479, 1481-84 (8th Cir. 1988) (luggage left with
airline); United States v. Presler, 610 F.2d 1206, 1213-14 (4th Cir. 1979)
(briefcase left with friend).
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other words, it is possible that the Court has intended the doctrine
not to apply where the third party is a mere conduit or bailee."1
When information is not directed to a particular third party but
is, in theory, observable by the general public, the Court has not
made clear whether we should look to what a member of the public
could do or to what people actually do. Thus, in providing the
critical fifth vote in the flyover case of Florida v. Riley," and
concurring only in the judgment, Justice O'Connor urged as
follows:
[T]he relevant inquiry ... is not whether the helicopter was where it
had a right to be under FAA regulations. Rather,.. . we must ask
whether the helicopter was in the public airways at an altitude at which
members of the public travel with sufficient regularity that Riley's
expectation of privacy from aerial observation was not one that society
is prepared to recognize as reasonable. 39
What unrelated private persons actually do is a much more limited
universe than what they are theoretically able or permitted to do.
B. The Last Twenty-Five Years
Aside from these uncertainties, how has the third party doctrine
fared in the last quarter century? Although we have not had a
"core" third party case in the Supreme Court for many years, there
have certainly been cases which some of the Justices believed to be
governed by the doctrine. Interestingly, the doctrine has not fared
well.
In Bond v. United States,40 decided in 2000, the question was
whether law enforcement's squeeze of overhead luggage on a bus
constituted a Fourth Amendment search. Despite Justice Breyer's
objection that the holding departed from settled doctrine,4' the
3 This would mean, for example, that there would be Fourth Amendment
protection for email held by a service provider. The Sixth Circuit so held
despite service provider algorithms scanning the email content. See United
States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 286-87 (6th Cir. 2010).
3 488 U.S. 445, 454 (1989).
39 Id. at 454.
40 529 U.S. 334, 335 (2000).
41 See id. at 342 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("If we are to depart from established
legal principles, we should not begin here.").
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Court held that it was a search, alleging the dubious distinction that
"[p]hysically invasive inspection is simply more intrusive than
purely visual inspection." 42  The author's Criminal Procedure
students year after year would prefer that their overhead luggage
be squeezed as opposed to a helicopter being flown over their
backyard, not to mention the many other invasions the Court has
traditionally allowed under the auspices of the third party doctrine.
The holding is, however, consistent with O'Connor's urged
limitation: Although the bag is accessible to the public and could
be squeezed in this manner, we in fact do not handle each other's
bags in this way.43 The holding is also consistent with a normative
limitation in that we should be able to expect more from others in
our society, and certainly from police. Either way, it is the product
of a more nuanced third party doctrine."
In Ferguson v. City of Charleston,45 decided in 2001, the
question was whether the Fourth Amendment restricted a state
hospital from obtaining urine samples of pregnant patients, testing
those samples for illegal drugs, and passing on the results to police.
Although the dissent urged the false-friend cases of the third party
doctrine,46 the Court focused on why the case did not fit under its
"special needs" doctrine that sometimes permits suspicionless drug
testing, and remanded the case for a determination of consent.47
42 Id. at 337.
43 The Bond Court explained as follows:
When a bus passenger places a bag in an overhead bin, he expects that other
passengers or bus employees may move it for one reason or another. Thus,
a bus passenger clearly expects that his bag may be handled. He does not
expect that other passengers or bus employees will, as a matter of course,
feel the bag in an exploratory manner. But this is exactly what the agent
did here. We therefore hold that the agent's physical manipulation of
petitioner's bag violated the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 338-39.
44 The holding in Bond is also consistent with the trespass theory resurrected
in Jones. See infra notes 95-105 and accompanying text.
45 532 U.S. 67, 69-70 (2001).
46 See id. at 93-96 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
47 See id. at 76, 79-86. Justice Kennedy wrote separately to critique the
Court's special needs analysis. See id. at 86-88 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment). The dissenters also took issue with that analysis. See id. at 98-103.
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But under the false-friend cases, there was consent: Undercover
agents and moles do not obtain "informed consent" either, and
under Miller the doctrine is to apply "even if the information is
revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited
purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will not be
betrayed."4 8 Hence, while the majority did not wish to admit it,
Ferguson is inconsistent with a robust third party doctrine: There
appear to be circumstances in which voluntarily conveying
information for a third party's use does not vitiate a reasonable
expectation of privacy.4 9
In Kyllo v. United States,"o also decided in 2001, the question
was whether law enforcement use of a thermal imager to view the
heat emanating from a private residence constituted a Fourth
Amendment search. Although four Justices believed it did not-
this merely captures what is in the public domain"-a majority of
the Court held otherwise so long as the thermal imaging
technology was "not in general public use."52 On this theory, it is
therefore not determinative that information is made publicly
available, at least where access requires technology. As Justice
O'Connor urged in Riley," the majority looked not to what persons
could do, but to what they actually do.
In Georgia v. Randolph,54 decided in 2006, the question was
whether a cotenant's consent was effective as against a present,
objecting cotenant. Although the dissenters urged the assumption
of risk of the third party doctrine," a majority held that we must
look to the societal expectation, and the expectation is that a party
rejected by one cotenant will not enter." There is certainly much
48 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976).
49 On remand, the Fourth Circuit found a lack of "informed consent." See
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 308 F.3d 380 (4th Cir. 2002).
so 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001).
51 See id. at 41-43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).52 Id. at 34-35, 40 (majority opinion).
5 See supra note 39.
54 547 U.S. 103, 106 (2006).
5 See id. at 128, 132-33 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
56 See id. at 111, 113-14 (majority opinion).
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left to be desired when we get an empirically-based opinion
without any empirics, but once again the third party doctrine did
not prevail, and in the records context the societal expectation is
very often-if not typically-that records shared with another for a
limited purpose not be further shared outside of that relationship."
The Randolph Court also discussed that one retains a reasonable
expectation of privacy in hotel rooms despite the entrance of
others, and the same rule applies to apartments and shared office
space. "
In City of Ontario v. Quon,5 9 decided in 2010, the question was
whether a pager customer retained a reasonable expectation of
privacy in communications residing with the service provider.co If
we accept a "limited" third party doctrine, this would be answered
in the affirmative.6 1 Rather than decide that issue, for purposes of
the decision the Court unanimously assumed that one does retain
such an expectation,6 2 and reaffirmed the broad application of the
Fourth Amendment: "The Amendment guarantees the privacy,
dignity, and security of persons against certain arbitrary and
invasive acts by officers of the Government, without regard to
5 For example, consider phone records. When it came to light that employees
of Hewlett Packard had obtained the phone records of board members in order
to investigate alleged information leaks, the backlash cost chairwoman Patricia
Dunn her job, resulted in the passage of anti-pretexting legislation at both the
state and federal level, a $14.5 million civil settlement, and the filing of both
state and federal criminal charges. See 18 U.S.C. § 1039 (2006) (federal anti-
pretexting legislation); Damon Darlin, Ex-Chairwoman Among 5 Charged in
Hewlett Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2006, at Al; Jim Hopkins & Jon Swartz,
Investigations Continue at HP, USA TODAY, Oct. 5, 2006, at B2; Ellen
Nakashima, HP, Calif Settle Spying Lawsuit, WASH. PoST, Dec. 8, 2006, at DI;
Jordan Robertson, U.S. Wins First Guilty Plea in HP Boardroom Spy Probe,
PHIL. INQUIRER, Jan. 13, 2007, at C2. It is readily apparent that people and their
elected representatives expect phone records to remain private despite their
retention by one's telecommunications provider.
58 See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 112.
" 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2624-25 (2010).
60 The pager was owned by a public employer, but that nuance is not relevant
to the arguments of this Article. See id at 2624.
61 See supra note 36.
62 See Quon, 130 S. Ct. at 2630.
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whether the government actor is investigating crime or performing
another function."63 Although Justice Scalia opted not to sign on
to what he considered "[t]he-times-they-are-a-changin' " dicta,'
eight Justices expressed cautionary language that is far from
mechanical application of a categorical third party doctrine:
The Court must proceed with care when considering the whole
concept of privacy expectations in communications made on electronic
equipment.. . .The judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the
Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role
in society has become clear....
Rapid changes in the dynamics of communication and information
transmission are evident not just in the technology itself but in what
society accepts as proper behavior. . . . At present, it is uncertain how
workplace norms, and the law's treatment of them, will evolve....
Cell phone and text message communications are so pervasive that
some persons may consider them to be essential means or necessary
instruments for self-expression, even self-identification. That might
strengthen the case for an expectation of privacy. 65
Thus, in at least five decisions the Supreme Court has shied away
from applying a strong third party doctrine, while also not very
clearly articulating an alternative rule. Moreover, as James
Dempsey has pointed out, in a 1989 decision the Court rejected a
third party doctrine in interpreting a Freedom of Information Act
exception.6 6 Albeit in a different context, the Court's unanimous
rejection of what it considered to be a "cramped notion of personal
privacy" is significant.7
63 Id at 2627 (internal quotation marks omitted).
6 See id. at 2635 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
65 Id. at 2629-30 (majority opinion).
66 See James X. Dempsey, The Path to ECPA Reform and the Implications of
United States v. Jones, 47 U.S.F. L. REv. 225, 242-43 (2012) (citing U.S. Dep't
of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989)).
The Court distinguished information privacy and decisional privacy, and with
respect to the former recognized the control theory of information privacy.
Reporters Comm. at 763 ("To begin with, both the common law and the literal
understandings of privacy encompass the individual's control of information
concerning his or her person.").
67 Reporters Comm. at 763. Justices Blackmun and Brennan concurred only
the judgment, but in a manner that similarly rejects a third party doctrine. See
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C. Other Courts
There are two other sources that deserve mention. First, while
lower federal courts are of course beholden to what the Supreme
Court decides, until more clear instruction is received, it is relevant
how they have interpreted the third party doctrine. Second, if we
care not solely about the federal Constitution but rather more
broadly about what constitutional rights people have, we must also
look to state constitutions as they have been interpreted by the
respective highest courts.
Lower federal courts should arguably follow the High Court's
third party doctrine even if they were to believe the Supreme Court
has begun to shift.68 So, what have lower courts held? Where
another right or interest is implicated, they have granted
constitutional protection. Thus, at least three district courts have
rejected subpoenas or other requests seeking book or movie
purchases.69 As one court sagely noted:
[I]f word were to spread over the Net-and it would-that the FBI and
the IRS had demanded and received Amazon's list of customers and
their personal purchases, the chilling effect on expressive e-commerce
would frost keyboards across America. Fiery rhetoric quickly would
follow and the nuances of the subpoena (as actually written and served)
would be lost as the cyberdebate roiled itself to a furious boil. One
might ask whether this court should concern itself with blogger outrage
disproportionate to the government's actual demand of Amazon. The
logical answer is yes, it should: well-founded or not, rumors of an
id. at 780-81.
68 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484
(1989) ("If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears
to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals
should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the
prerogative of overruling its own decisions.").
69 See Amazon.com v. Lay, 758 F. Supp. 2d 1154, 1167-69 (W.D. Wash.
2010) (rejecting request for expressive records under the First Amendment); In
re Grand Jury Investigation of Possible Violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1461,
706 F. Supp. 2d 11, 16-23 (D.D.C. 2009) (rejecting grand jury subpoena under
the First Amendment); In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Amazon.com Dated
August 7, 2006, 246 F.R.D. 570, 572-74 (W.D. Wis. 2007) (rejecting grand jury
subpoena under the First Amendment and using a creative opt in procedure to
avoid the problem).
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Orwellian federal criminal investigation into the reading habits of
Amazon's customers could frighten countless potential customers into
canceling planned online book purchases, now and perhaps forever. 70
Courts have similarly granted Fourth Amendment protection to
medical records residing with a third party provider." It is not
immediately clear whether it is best to approach such cases as First
Amendment cases, due process cases, or Fourth Amendment cases
informed by those other rights, but there has lately been some
scholarly work on how to conceptualize these relationships,7 2 and
at the very least the cases demonstrate that any third party doctrine
is effectively not absolute.
Nor are such decisions limited to where another constitutional
right is at stake. Courts have also looked to statutes and the
common law in granting Fourth Amendment protections."
Although some might object to such a feedback loop in
70 In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Amazon.com Dated August 7, 2006, 246
F.R.D. at 573.
7' See, e.g., Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 450-52 (4th Cir. 2000) (requiring
a warrant, or at the very least probable cause, to access medical records); State
v. Skinner, 10 So. 3d 1212, 1218 (La. 2009) (requiring a warrant to obtain
prescription and/or medical records); Commonwealth v. Riedel, 539 Pa. 172,
182-83 (1994) (typically requiring a warrant to access medical records). But see
Williams v. Commonwealth, 213 S.W.3d 671 (Ky. 2006) (finding no reasonable
expectation of privacy in limited search of pharmacy records); People v. Perlos,
436 Mich. 318-31 (1990) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy for
blood alcohol records in the context of an automobile accident).
72 See Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82
N.Y.U. L. REv. 112 (2007); Katherine J. Strandburg, Freedom of Association in
a Networked World: First Amendment Regulation of Relational Surveillance,
49 B.C. L. REv. 741 (2008); see also New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S.
868, 873-75 (1986) (recognizing First Amendment relevance in searches and
seizures of literary materials but rejecting a higher standard of probable cause).
7 See, e.g., Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, 474-75 (6th Cir. 2007)
(looking to federal statute in requiring warrant for e-mail), vacated on other
grounds by 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008); Doe v. Broderick, 225 F.3d 440, 450
(4th Cir. 2000) (looking to federal statute in requiring warrant for medical
records); DeMassa v. Nunez, 770 F.2d 1505, 1506-07 (9th Cir. 1985) (looking
to other constitutional provisions, federal and state statutes, case law, and codes
of professional responsibilities in requiring warrant for attorney files); People v.
Gutierrez, 222 P.3d 925, 932-36 (Colo. 2009) (looking to federal and state
statutes and case law in requiring warrant for tax preparer records).
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constitutional analysis, given that the criterion is the
"reasonableness" of police conduct, it is eminently sound.
Whether one takes an empirical view of reasonableness-meaning
what persons actually expect-or whether one takes a normative
view of reasonableness-meaning what persons are entitled to
expect in a free and open society-it is relevant what the law
permits and prohibits. For example, whether the thermal imager of
Kyllo is in "general public use"74 will depend not solely upon
developments in technology and consumer choice, but also upon
any statutory restrictions on the sale or use of such devices.
Finally, a few words on state constitutions: Not only do they
potentially add constitutional rights to the federal Fourth
Amendment floor, but they are themselves relevant in determining
that floor. In deciding whether warrantless arrests in public were
constitutional, the Supreme Court looked to state practice." In
considering warrantless home entry, the Court looked to state
practice.76 Indeed, because the overall numbers were not very
persuasive to its conclusion, the Court gave credence to the trend
in state practice," as it did to justify its about-face regarding the
constitutionality of the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule."
State practice is helpful "when the constitutional standard is as
amorphous as the word 'reasonable,' and when custom and
contemporary norms [thus] necessarily play such a large role in the
constitutional analysis."" This is especially true of state
constitutional decisions: "[B]y invoking a state constitutional
provision, a state court immunizes its decision from review by [the
federal Supreme] Court. This heightened degree of immutability
underscores the depth of the principle underlying the result.""o
Every state has a cognate or analog to the federal Fourth
Amendment, and while the jurisprudence might not be as
74 533 U.S. 27, 34, 40 (2001).
75 See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 421-22 (1976).
76 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 598-600 (1980).
77 See id.
78 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651 (1961).
79 Payton, 445 U.S. at 600.
80 Id.
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developed as we might like, a significant number of states deviate
from the Fourth Amendment's third party doctrine." On the
precise issue in Jones, namely location tracking, several states took
the lead.82 In 1988, a unanimous Supreme Court of Oregon
deviated from the federal beeper cases and held that using a radio
transmitter to locate an automobile constitutes a search typically
requiring a warrant." In 2003, a unanimous Supreme Court of
Washington agreed and required a warrant for GPS tracking under
the Washington constitution.8 4 In 2009, the New York high court
required a warrant for GPS tracking under its state constitution:
The whole of a person's progress through the world, into both public
and private spatial spheres, can be charted and recorded over lengthy
periods . ... Disclosed in the data ... will be trips the indisputably
private nature of which takes little imagination to conjure: trips to the
psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS treatment
81 See Stephen E. Henderson, Learning from All Fifty States: How To Apply
the Fourth Amendment and Its State Analogs To Protect Third Party
Information from Unreasonable Search, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 373, 395 (2006).
82 See People v. Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d 433, 445 (2009) (requiring warrant); State
v. Jackson, 76 P.3d 217, 224 (Wash. 2003) (requiring warrant); State v.
Campbell, 759 P.2d 1040, 1049 (Or. 1988) (requiring warrant). This is not to
say that all states agree. See Osburn v. State, 44 P.3d 523, 526 (Nev. 2002)
(holding no search).
83 Campbell, 759 P.2d at 1049 ("[I]f the state's position in this case is correct,
no movement, no location and no conversation in a 'public place' would in any
measure be secure from the prying of the government. There would in addition
be no ready means for individuals to ascertain when they were being scrutinized
and when they were not. That is nothing short of a staggering limitation upon
personal freedom.").
84 Jackson, 76 P.3d at 223 ("[T]he intrusion into private affairs made possible
with a GPS device is quite extensive as the information obtained can disclose a
great deal about an individual's life. For example, the device can provide a
detailed record of travel to doctors' offices, banks, gambling casinos, tanning
salons, places of worship, political party meetings, bars, grocery stores, exercise
gyms, places where children are dropped off for school, play, or day care, the
upper scale restaurant and the fast food restaurant, the strip club, the opera, the
baseball game, the 'wrong' side of town, the family planning clinic, the labor
rally. In this age, vehicles are used to take people to a vast number of places
that can reveal preferences, alignments, associations, personal ails and foibles.
The GPS tracking devices record all of these travels, and thus can provide a
detailed picture of one's life.").
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center, the strip club, the criminal defense attorney, the by-the-hour
motel, the union meeting, the mosque, synagogue or church, the gay
bar and on and on. What the technology yields and records with
breathtaking quality and quantity is a highly detailed profile, not simply
of where we go, but by easy inference, of our associations-political,
religious, amicable and amorous, to name only a few-and of the
pattern of our professional and avocational pursuits. 85
The Massachusetts Supreme Court has held similarly under its
state constitution, though focusing on the intrusion as a seizure
rather than a search." Not all states have agreed," but these
decisions make a forceful case for constitutionally restricting
location surveillance.
So, on the eve of Jones we had a potentially "limited" third
party doctrine that might constitutionally protect information
provided to a conduit or bailee, that might constitutionally protect
information exposed to the public but not regularly obtained by
that public, that might constitutionally protect information that
enjoys other constitutional or statutory protection, and that might
be ripe for change given developments in technology and social
norms and trends in state constitutional law.
Ill. UNITED STATES V. JONES
Police (in particular a joint FBI and District of Columbia
Metropolitan Police task force) believed Antoine Jones to be
involved in trafficking narcotics." Based on information gathered
in a significant investigation,89 they applied for and received a
warrant to install, and then monitor, a GPS tracking device on a
Jeep Grand Cherokee registered to Jones's wife. Police thereafter
installed just such a device, and remotely monitored the location of
that vehicle to within fifty to one hundred feet over a twenty-eight-
day period. The tracker broadcast the location of the vehicle to a
government computer, generating more than two thousand pages
85 Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1199-1200.
86 Commonwealth v. Connolly, 913 N.E.2d 356, 369-70 (Mass. 2009).
87 See Osburn, 44 P.3d at 526 (holding that tracking is not a search).
88 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012).
89 Ultimately, the investigation included physical surveillance, wiretaps,
camera surveillance, and the GPS tracking. Id.
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of location data. Based on this investigation, the Government
linked Jones to a stash house containing $850,000 in cash and at
least that much value in cocaine and cocaine base.o
Unfortunately, when police installed the device, they failed to
follow the warrant's instructions. They installed it on the eleventh
day, when the warrant permitted a ten-day window, and they
installed it outside of the District of Columbia." In response to
Jones's motion to suppress, the Government argued that the Fourth
Amendment was not implicated.9 2 Jones had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his vehicle's location while that vehicle
was in any public place: Any member of the public could see the
vehicle, and thus so could the police.
It was not difficult for the Court to understand the implications
of the Government's theory. At oral argument, Chief Justice
Roberts inquired whether the Government's position was
genuinely that it could, for any reason or no reason, monitor the
movements of the Justices for a month without Fourth Amendment
restraint. The Government believed it could,94 and it lost nine to
zero. The Court was not unanimous, however, in its reasoning.
A. Scalia Five
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court, joined by Chief Justice
Roberts and by Associate Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and
Sotomayor, held that the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy
criterion added to, but did not eliminate, the former trespass
conception of Fourth Amendment search." In a nutshell, at one
time the Court held that the Fourth Amendment was only
90 Id. at 948-49.
91 Id. at 948. The Government did not argue that such failures do not require
suppression, a position it might now regret. See id. at 964 n. 11 (Alito, J.,
concurring) (pointing out this lack of argument).
92 Id. at 948 n. 1, 950 (majority opinion)
93 Transcript of Oral Argument at 9-10, Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (No. 10-1259),
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral arguments/argument
transcripts/10-1259.pdf.
94 Id.
95 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950-52.
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implicated by a tangible interference with "persons, houses,
papers, and effects.""6 Thus, for example, a wiretap could
implicate the Fourth Amendment, but only if its installation
included a trespass into a constitutionally protected area, namely a
"house."9 7 Similarly, eavesdropping did not implicate the Fourth
Amendment absent such a trespass,9 8 but upon such a trespass-
even merely that of a spike microphone intruding by an inch-
there was a Fourth Amendment search." Under this conception,
law enforcement placing and monitoring a recording device upon
the public telephone booth in which Katz infamously placed a call
would not implicate the Fourth Amendment.'oo But the Court
found a Fourth Amendment violation in Katz in an opinion strong
on rhetoric but weak on legal rules, and the Court ultimately
adopted Justice Harlan's reasonable expectation of privacy
criterion for what constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.' 0
Jones thus resurrects the dormant trespass criterion: When
police placed the GPS device upon the vehicle, they physically
trespassed upon a constitutionally protected area (an "effect") in
order to obtain information, and thereby engaged in a Fourth
Amendment search.'O2 Unfortunately, nobody has a clue what
96 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31-32
(2001).
9 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464-66 (1928).
98 Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134-36 (1942).
9 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510-12 (1961).
100 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967).
'o' See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (articulating test); United States v.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (recognizing adoption by Court). For an articulation
of this history, see Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 959-60 (Alito, J., concurring) and
Henderson, supra note 36, at 511-21. For an alternative telling, see Orin S.
Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth Amendment Searches, SUP. CT. REV.
(forthcoming).
102 In order to avoid reversing Knotts and Karo, the Court distinguished
installing a device bejbre Jones possessed the vehicle. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at
952. This would seem to permit the Government to install GPS tracking devices
in all vehicles upon the consent of car manufacturers, and is unpersuasive.
The Court did not decide what restraint renders the Jones trespass reasonable.
See id. at 954; see also State v. Brereton, 2013 WI 17, 43 (Wis. 2013)
(requiring warrant for vehicle location tracking); State v. Zahn, 812 N.W.2d
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theory of trespass to chattel the Court was invoking, and thus we
do not know what will suffice in other circumstances.' 3 For
example, say police lay hands upon a person and ask her a
question. We know this likely constitutes a so-called "Terry stop,"
which is a Fourth Amendment seizure, and we know that such a
stop is permissible upon reasonable suspicion.'0 4 But since this
also seems a physical trespass upon a constitutionally protected
area (a "person"), and it is for the purpose of obtaining
information, is it also a search? Does it matter? How about the
examination of the exterior of a vehicle in a parking lot? Purely
visual inspection would seem to remain unregulated, but what of
taking fingerprints, tire impressions, or paint scrapings? These
techniques are probably searches, since they interfere with the
property at least as significantly as did the magnetic installation of
a GPS device. That is not to say, of course, that they necessarily
require a warrant or other judicial preclearance before they are
reasonable; the author suspects we will learn the contrary. The
point is merely that many new questions now arise.'o0
Fortunately, those questions can be set aside in discussing the
third party doctrine. The Court made very clear that this trespass-
490, 499 (S.D. 2012) (requiring warrant for vehicle location tracking); United
States v. Ortiz, 878 F. Supp. 2d. 515, 536-37 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (requiring warrant
for vehicle location tracking).
103 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 n.2, 961-62 (Alito, J., concurring in the
judgment); Peter A. Winn, Trespass and the Fourth Amendment: Some
Reflections on Jones, USVJONES.COM (June 4, 2012), http://usvjones.com/2012/
06/04/trespass-and-the-fourth-amendment-some-reflections-on-jones/#more-
199.
104 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
1os For example, does the result in California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35
(1988), change because collection of trash awaiting collection is a trespass to the
trash receptacle? See United States v. Weston, No. 2:12-CR-79 JVB, 2012 WL
3987291 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 10, 2012) (holding that the result does not change).
Does writing in chalk on a tire to monitor a limited-time parking space
constitute a Fourth Amendment search? Does the search of stolen property (for
example, a laptop) constitute a search because trespass is an offense against
possession? Does running a hash function on computer files and comparing the
results only to known child pornography constitute a search under the trespass
conception?
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based conception is merely the minimum protection afforded by the
Fourth Amendment:
The concurrence faults our approach for "present[ing] particularly
vexing problems" in cases that do not involve physical contact, such as
those that involve the transmission of electronic signals. We entirely
fail to understand that point. For unlike the concurrence, which would
make Katz the exclusive test, we do not make trespass the exclusive
test. Situations involving merely the transmission of electronic signals
without trespass would remain subject to Katz analysis. 06
The Court's opinion depends upon a trespass rationale, and thus
leaves the third party doctrine right where it found it. As an aside,
it is interesting to ponder whether Jones might be a first step in the
Court jettisoning the reasonable expectation of privacy criterion,
and instead using a dictionary-definition of "search"'" and relying
upon the protection against "unreasonable" searches and seizures
to do most all of the work. Certainly Justice Scalia would favor
this change, as would this author.'s Much of the Court's
reasonable expectation of privacy jurisprudence would remain
relevant, but it would inform whether the dictionary-definition
search was reasonable.
1o6 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 953. The Court concluded, "It may be that achieving
the same result through electronic means, without an accompanying trespass, is
an unconstitutional invasion of privacy, but the present case does not require us
to answer that question." Id. at 954.
107 For example, Webster's defines search as "to look into or over carefully or
thoroughly in an effort to find ... something." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2048 (2002).
'0 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32-33 (2001) (criticizing Katz's
reasonable expectation of privacy on this basis); Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S.
83, 91-92 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (same); Henderson, supra note 36, at
544-46. Whereas Justice Scalia favors reasonableness keyed to history, the
author favors a more flexible empirical approach with an ultimate normative
backdrop of what should be permissible in a free and open society. Justice
Harlan, the author of the reasonable expectation of privacy criterion, ultimately
favored something more like the author's approach. See United States v. White,
401 U.S. 745, 786-90 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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B. Alito Four
Justice Alito, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan,
concurred only in the judgment.'" Alito found the Court's
application of "18th-century tort law" to this "21st-century
surveillance" to be misguided and ironic-so much so that he spent
more ink criticizing the majority than analyzing the case."'
Ultimately, Alito used the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy
criterion, and concluded that the long-term monitoring of the
movements of Jones's vehicle constituted a Fourth Amendment
search. "'
Alito adopted an empirical notion of the reasonable
expectation, commenting upon the potential for technological
developments to place "popular expectations" in flux, and upon the
potential that people will "eventually reconcile themselves" to
those changes or will adopt legislation to push back. 1l2 With
respect to location information in particular, Alito noted closed-
circuit television cameras, toll road transponders, and cell phone
location tracking, and concluded that "[t]he availability and use of
these and other new devices will continue to shape the average
person's expectations about the privacy of his or her daily
movements.""3
Although Alito, channeling and citing Orin Kerr, might deem
legislatures best equipped to regulate in the midst of technological
change,"' in the absence of that legislation Alito-now channeling
Daniel Solove"-had to decide the constitutional question without
that legislative assist."' Alito framed the question as "whether the
09 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957.
"OId. at 957-62.
" Id. at 962-94.
112 Id. at 962.
113 Id. at 963.
114 Id. at 964 (citing Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New
Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L.
REv. 801, 805-06 (2004)).
1s See Daniel Solove, Essay, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L.
REV. 1511, 1515, 1535-37 (2010).
" Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964.
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use of GPS tracking in a particular case involved a degree of
intrusion that a reasonable person would not have anticipated," and
answered in the affirmative as to long-term tracking for anything
but the most significant of crimes."' For those most serious crimes
("extraordinary offenses""'), police might have engaged in non-
technologically enhanced visual long-term surveillance despite the
very significant resource expenditure, but otherwise-now
channeling William Stuntz"'-Alito believed that only short-term
surveillance would be expected. Alito did not identify "the point at
which the tracking of [Jones's] vehicle became a search," 20 an
issue that raises problems in implementation.121
What does the opinion of the Alito four mean for the third
party doctrine more generally? As the Court has often done,
Alito's is an empirical opinion without any empirics.'22 If the four
Justices would therefore look to the opinions in Smith, Miller, and
their progeny'2 3 as accurately describing the empirical societal
expectations at that time, presumably the same result should hold
unless those expectations have changed. But those expectations
were never what the Court claimed them to be. When the Court
gave no constitutional protection to banking records, Congress
responded with statutory protection.'2 4 When the Court gave no
constitutional protection to telephone dialing records, Congress
" Id.
18 Id.
"9 See William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1265, 1278-80 (1999).
120 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964.
121 See sources cited supra note 10.
122 For example, in Smith v. Maryland, the Court assumed what persons knew
and expected regarding phone company records. See Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735, 742-43 (1979). In Oliver v. United States, the Court assumed that
persons do not engage in intimate activities in "open fields" and that persons
routinely ignore "No Trespassing" signs and the laws of criminal trespass. See
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984). In Georgia v. Randolph, the
Court assumed that a would-be visitor confronted with conflicting cotenants
would stay out. See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 113 (2006).
123 See supra Part II.A.
24 See Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3422
(2006).
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responded with statutory protection. 125 The reason courts have
diverged as a matter of state constitutional law,'26 and that many
relevant state statutes have been passed, 2 7 is because in the 1960s,
1970s, and 1980s, reasonable persons did expect privacy in these
records. But whether such expectations are merely a continuation
of the status quo or represent a societal shift, there is certainly
evidence to urge that reasonable persons today do not anticipate or
approve of private or public persons having unrestricted access to
all information they trust to third parties.
C. Sotomayor Solo
Can you have your cake and eat it too? Justice Sotomayor
joined Scalia's opinion, thus creating a Court majority for
reinvigorating the dormant trespass analysis, but also wrote a
separate concurrence that potentially goes farther than the Alito
opinion, and is the only opinion to specifically address the core
third party doctrine.
First, Sotomayor agrees with Scalia: "[A] search within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs, at a minimum where,
as here, the Government obtains information by physically
intruding on a constitutionally protected area." 28  Second, she
agrees with Alito: "Under [the Katz] rubric, I agree with Justice
Alito that, at the very least, longer term GPS monitoring in
investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of
privacy."' 29 Indeed, to Sotomayor even short-term GPS
monitoring is potentially of Fourth Amendment concern because it
gathers a wealth of information, is surreptitious, is no longer
resource constrained, and chills associational and expressive
125 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127 (2006).
126 See Henderson, supra note 81.
127 See, e.g., 9 C.J.S. Banks and Banking § 269 (2008) (summarizing
restrictions on government access to bank records); Tracy A. Bateman, Search
and Seizure of Bank Records Pertaining to Customer as Violation of Customer's
Rights Under State Law, 3 A.L.R. 5th 453 (1995).
128 United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 954 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted).
129 Id. at 955 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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freedoms.' 30 Like Alito, Sotomayor would consider an empirical
conception of reasonable expectation, but one with a normative
overlay:
I would ask whether people reasonably expect that their movements
will be recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the
Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their political and
religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on. . . . I would also consider the
appropriateness of entrusting to the Executive, in the absence of any
oversight from a coordinate branch, a tool so amenable to misuse,
especially in light of the Fourth Amendment's goal to curb arbitrary
exercises of police power ... and [to] prevent a too permeating police
surveillance. 131
Finally, Sotomayor directly confronts the third party doctrine:
More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that
an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information
voluntarily disclosed to third parties. This approach is ill suited to the
digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about
themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.
People disclose the phone numbers that they dial or text to their cellular
providers; the URLs that they visit and the e-mail addresses with which
they correspond to their Internet service providers; and the books,
groceries, and medications they purchase to online retailers. Perhaps,
as Justice Alito notes, some people may find the "tradeoff' of privacy
for convenience "worthwhile," or come to accept this "diminution of
privacy" as "inevitable," and perhaps not. I for one doubt that people
would accept without complaint the warrantless disclosure to the
Government of a list of every Web site they had visited in the last
week, or month, or year. But whatever the societal expectations, they
can attain constitutionally protected status only if our Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence ceases to treat secrecy as a prerequisite for
privacy. I would not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed
to some member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason
alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.132
While it was not necessary to the resolution of Jones, it seems
there is one relatively secure vote for abolishing any strong form of
the third party doctrine.
130 See id. at 955-56.
131 Id. at 956 (internal quotation marks omitted).
132 Id. at 957 (citation omitted).
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IV. LOOKING FORWARD - A CAUTIOUS OPTIMISM
Jones was a major victory for those desiring some restraint on
very invasive government surveillance. It is (wonderfully) hard to
imagine an America in which Jones comes out the other way, and
thus this author was not a bit surprised at the outcome. Until the
oral argument, it might have been foolhardy to predict a 9-0 result,
but that argument made very clear that the Justices "got it," and in
retrospect everyone should have predicted such a result. It is, of
course, far too easy to throw around such labels, but there is not
much that seems more Orwellian than law enforcement tracking all
of our movements without restraint.
But then it seems equally Orwellian for law enforcement to
peruse all of our banking records, telecommunications records
(other than content of conversations), medical records, media
consumption records, and commercial records without restraint.
Indeed, in working with different government officials in the
course of six years as Reporter for a relevant volume in the
American Bar Association ("ABA") Criminal Justice Standards,
the author has not met a single one who advocates such law
enforcement behavior. There were, at times, significant
disagreements about how best to regulate law enforcement, but
nobody seems to advocate carte blanche access. For those who
believe the Fourth Amendment should have some role, there is
something seriously wrong with a robust third party doctrine.
Hopefully this Article has demonstrated that said "wrong" is
not as pervasive in existing law as some might think, because even
the existing doctrine has some significant limitations. And there is
good cause to be cautiously optimistic about the future. The states
have always been our laboratories. They "road tested" the
principles that became our Fourth Amendment and the rest of our
Constitution, and in recent years they have once again taken up
that mantle in the interpretation of their own constitutions.
Legislatures have also stepped into the breach, and will continue to
do so.' For example, the California legislature recently
133 Despite the utility of legislative regulations, we must always have a
constitutional backstop. In the words of Anthony Amsterdam: "Even if our
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overwhelmingly approved legislation typically requiring a warrant
to access location records. 3 4 Although the bill was vetoed by the
governor,'" it will not be the last word on the matter. Respected
organizations will contribute their ideas, like the newly adopted
ABA Criminal Justice Standards on Law Enforcement Access to
Third Party Records.'3 6 As Reporter, the author is thoroughly
biased, but the Standards reflect wise compromises and a very
promising template for legislatures, courts, and administrative
agencies confronting how best to regulate law enforcement access
to information. So, again, there is some cause for cautious
optimism.
V. CONCLUSION
United States v. Jones raises many questions, but hopefully in
time it will be seen as helping to answer one: that the Fourth
Amendment will continue to have a meaningful role in regulating
twenty-first century searches. It would be foolish to think the
Supreme Court will ultimately adopt the "right" answer, if that is
defined by precisely the world as any one commentator would
have it. And perhaps in a few years the author will be sufficiently
growing crime rate and its attendant mounting hysteria should level off, there
will remain more than enough crime and fear of it in American society to keep
our legislatures from the politically suicidal undertaking of police control."
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives On The Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L.
REv. 349, 379 (1974). The author might not be as down on legislatures as
Professor Amsterdam was, but there comes a point at which his observation will
prove true.
134 See Cal. S.B. 1434 (Apr. 9, 2012). The Assembly approved the bill by a
vote of 63-11 and the Senate by a vote of 33-3. See Around the Capitol, SB
1434, http://www.aroundthecapitol.com/Bills/SB 1434/20112012/ (last visited
Apr. 20, 2013). Similar legislation has been introduced in Congress. See ECPA
2.0 Act of 2012, H.R. 6529, 112th Cong. (2012).
135 James Temple, Brown Vetoes Bill on Location Privacy, SAN FRAN. CHRON.
(Oct. 4, 2012, 5:59 PM), http://blog.sfgate.com/techchron/2012/10/02/gov-
brown-vetoes-cell-phone-privacy-bill/.
136 The Standards are available from the American Bar Association. Law
Enforcement Access to Third Party Records Standards, AM. BAR Ass'N,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminaljustice/policy/standards/
law enforcement access.html.
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disappointed in what has come to pass that he will return, like
Anthony Amsterdam, to reading "Supreme Court search and
seizure cases with the righteous indignation that only academics
can consistently sustain."'" But here there are no easy "just right"
answers. So, it is encouraging to see the Supreme Court taking a
case-by-case approach. Jones can be read as a return to the more
flexible approach of Katz, which is more likely to get the "right"
result in a particular case, even if it also leaves the doctrine a bit
nebulous for future cases.' It is encouraging that there are many
137 Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives On The Fourth Amendment, 58
MINN. L. REV. 349, 349 (1974). For a terrific description of some inherent court
limitations, including those particular to the limited government norm of the
Fourth Amendment, see id. at 350-55. If inspired to pull Amsterdam's
magnificent article, be sure to read his fifth footnote.
138 Again we can turn to the wise words of Professor Amsterdam: "[T]he Katz
decision was written to resist captivation in any formula. An opinion which sets
aside prior formulas with the observation that they cannot 'serve as a talismanic
solution to every Fourth Amendment problem' should hardly be read as
intended to replace them with a new talisman." Id. at 385. Professor
Amsterdam continues:
Katz is important for its rejection of several limitations upon the
operation of the amendment, but it offers neither a comprehensive test of
fourth amendment coverage nor any positive principles by which questions
of coverage can be resolved. The fourth amendment is not limited to
protection against physical trespass, although the pre-constitutional history
of the amendment was concerned with trespasses. "Searches" are not
particular methods by which government invades constitutionally protected
interests: they are a description of the conclusion that such interests have
been invaded. . . . In the end, the basis of the Katz decision seems to be that
the fourth amendment protects those interests that may justifiably claim
fourth amendment protection.
Of course this begs the question. But I think it begs the question no more
or less than any other theory of fourth amendment coverage that the Court
has used.
Id. Justice Breyer has similarly urged:
[T]he Fourth Amendment does not insist upon bright-line rules. Rather, it
recognizes that no single set of legal rules can capture the ever-changing
complexity of human life. It consequently uses the general terms
"unreasonable searches and seizures." And this Court has continuously
emphasized that "[r]easonableness is measured by examining the totality of
the circumstances."
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alternative decision makers even if the federal Supreme Court
ultimately provides little Fourth Amendment protection. Perhaps
the author's expectations are too low, but with a little perspective
and some more time, perhaps the bumpy road of protections
against unreasonable search and seizure will not appear quite so
bad.
Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 125 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring) (internal
ellipses omitted).
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